In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt Brentano proposed a view of consciousness that neither has room nor need for a subject of mental acts, a soul.
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From Mental Holism to the Soul and Back
Mark Textor
Abstract: In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt Brentano proposed a view of consciousness that neither has room nor need for a subject of mental acts, a soul.
Later he changed his mind: there is a soul that appears in consciousness. In this paper I will argue that Brentano's change of view is not justified. The subjectless view of consciousness can be defended against Brentano's argument and it is superior to its predecessor.
Introduction
Descartes famously reported that in introspection he was aware of a simple substance, a soul or self. In his Treatise Hume, equally famously, countered:
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (Hume 1739/40, 252) In Hume's introspection no mental substance is given, only perceptions are. Neither sensation nor inner perception presents us with a substance. Just as in sensation we encounter the phenomena of warmth, colour and sound, we encounter in inner perception the phenomena of thinking, feeling and willing.
An entity which has them as properties we don't encounter. It is a fiction, which has no reality at all or, if it existed, its existence could not be certified. (Brentano 1874 I, 15-16 [8] ; my translation) 2 Consciousness or inner perception presents us with activities such as thinking and feeling, but not an active subject. Brentano goes on to say that the soul is a fiction. This is an over-statement. A soul may not be an object of experience, yet it may be an object of whose existence we convince ourselves by an inference to the best explanation.
However, it took Brentano just a few years to make a complete u-turn. In his manuscript 'Von der Seele' ('On the Soul') one can read: 3 1. I take a soul to be a substance whose accidents are the mental activities of the man. I call those accidents mental activities that are directed upon an object or, in Descartes' terminology, thinking something.
2. The existence of the activities is self-evident and will hardly be denied by a sensible person. In contrast some people think that they show particular scientific exactness when they dispute the legitimacy of conceiving of these activities as accidents of a substance.
When we say that you, a human being, see a rose, it is really a substance connected to the human being that has seeing a rose as an accident. Why does Brentano now side with Descartes against Hume? Is the change justified? In this essay I will answer these questions and in answering them shed light on Brentano's ontology that underlies his view of consciousness.
I will proceed by first motivating Brentano's Mental Holism that has neither room nor need for a mental substance. The central claim of Mental Holism is that at any time one has only one presentation of which simultaneous seeing, hearing etc. are different 'sides' that can be distinguished only by abstraction ( § § 2 -6). While Mental Holism is an attractive position, there is a main obstacle for it: simultaneous mental acts seem separable and therefore distinct ( § 7). Brentano responded to this problem by giving up Mental Holism and reintroducing the soul. Simultaneous mental acts are unified at a time by being accidents, particularized properties, of one and the same substance, a soul ( § 8). I will argue that the introduction of a soul does not solve the problem under consideration ( §9). The soul is also not an object of experience as Brentano claimed ( § § 10 -11). Since the introduction of the soul does not allow us to make progress, I will revisit the examples that are supposed to make the separability of simultaneous mental acts plausible. I will argue that they are compatible with Mental Holism ( § 12) . Mental Holism should not easily be abandoned in favour of the soul theory.
Perceiving Some Things Together
When Brentano developed his theory of consciousness in chapters II and III of the second book of Psychologie, he considered one mental act, hearing a tone, in isolation. This is, as he stressed later, a simplification intended to ease the discussion of other features:
In reality, such a simple state never occurs. It frequently happens, instead, that we have a rather large number of objects before our minds simultaneously, with which we enter into many diverse relations of consciousness. (Brentano 1874 I, 221 [120] )
The standard case is that we are directed on many diverse objects at the same time.
Singular intentionality is a limiting case that is never realised. Consider an example that brings out the intuition Brentano appealed to. Tye imagines himself to be a ship passenger:
Standing by the railing of a ship and smelling the sea air, as I look at the ship's wake in the ocean, I hear the sound of a tugboat from afar. Intuitively, it is not simply that I have an experience of a vivid blue color and also an experience of a salty smell and further an experience of a booming sound. Color, smell, and sound are experienced together; there is, as it were, a seamless phenomenal whole within which these qualities are phenomenologically present. (Tye 2007, 289-90) The passenger on the ship is simultaneously aware of a plurality of physical objects, colours, sounds, etc., together.
Brentano coined a number of different terms to cover different kinds of joint mental uptake of several things:
A ist miterfasst [co-apprehended] A is mitgeliebt [co-loved] (1907, 148) Brentano's 'mit erfasst' is modelled on compound German verbs with 'mit' such as 'mitgefangen'. If a fisherman throws out his net, he may co-catch (mitfangen) things he did not intend to catch. These things are the bycatch (Beifang). The bycaught things are caught together with the fish in one throw of the net. Brentano has cases in mind where one acknowledges, loves etc. some things together, although one does not acknowledge, love etc. each of them in isolation. Consider as an example co-loving. 4 Imagine that you love the taste of Parmesan cheese, but not its smell. If you go on using Parmesan in the kitchen, says Brentano, you co-love its sweet taste and you colove its smell. For you prefer them to their absence. But it is not the case that you love the sweet taste and you love the smell: you hate the smell. You only love the smell together with the taste because you can't have the taste without the smell.
Mental Atomism and Holism
When you perceive some things together, is your joint perception composed of several perceivings each of which is directed on a particular object, say a tone?
Mental Atomists answer this question with YES. Hume is a paradigmatic example. Just as there are physical atoms, there are mental atoms, impressions and ideas. Ideas are representations in their own right: 'ideas always represent their objects or impressions' (Hume 1739/40, 1.3.14.6) Let us go back to Tye's example of a joint perception to unpack Brentano's idea. If we are simultaneously aware of colours, sounds, smells etc. we can also be jointly aware of our simultaneous seeing, hearing, smelling etc. If we are jointly aware of these activities, argued Brentano, they form one mental phenomenon; consciousness at a time is one unit. Brentano's basic claim is:
If one is co-aware of some simultaneous mental activities, these are parts of one consciousness.
Prima facie, this view is not distinct from Atomism: Brentano and Mental Atomists agree that one's consciousness at a time has a multitude of parts. However, they disagree about the nature of these parts. According to Brentano, if we are jointly aware of seeing, hearing, tasting etc., these activities are conceptual parts of a single mental act or presentation. According to the Atomists, these activities are real parts, mental acts that exist prior to the whole and that are directed on objects. Let us get clear about the difference by sharpening our understanding of the notion of a conceptual part. The presentation of the tone and the presentation of the presentation of the tone form one single mental phenomenon, it is only by considering it in its relation to two different objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and the other a mental phenomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two presentations. (Brentano 1874 I, 176-9 [97-8] ; my emphasis, in part my
Already in his
Consciously hearing a tone is not a combination of two prior mental acts each of which has causal powers and intentionality. It is one unit that can be brought under two different partial concepts and thereby a conceptual division is effected.
Brentano said in the quote above that one can bring a mental act under different concepts 'only by considering it in its relation to two different objects'.
Which objects? He distinguished between 'immanent object' or the 'intentional correlate' of a mental act and real object. 6 Every mental act is supposed to have an intentional correlate, but some mental acts lack a real object. Take a case of auditory hallucination. When it merely seems to me that F is sounding now, there is an answer to the question 'What does appear to you now?'; this answer specifies the immanent object. One cannot be directed on something without being directed on it in a particular way. Hence, there is no mental act without an intentional correlate, but the intentional correlate of an act is not itself the object of the mental. The immanent object is rather a mode of presentation, a way in which something is given to us. The real object is the object that is, in the good case, given under this mode of presentation.
We have a choice now: do the conceptual distinctions that one makes when one divides one activity in, for example, seeing and consciousness draw on the real Tweety and killing Sparky, we merely register that ONE act has several objects.
In general, if one act has several objects, it satisfies several partial descriptions. In giving such a description one makes an abstraction in one of the literal senses of 'abstraction': one describes is 'abstracting' from some of its properties and relations. For example, to abstract a property is 'to present it to the mind apart from the other properties that usually go along with it in nature' (Bain quoted in OED entry). An abstraction is a partial conception of something in that it leaves something out. 8 This idea can now be applied to mental acts. When we are co-conscious of colours, smells, sounds etc., there is one presentation of them. This presentation satisfies different partial descriptions, such as 'my hearing F', 'my seeing blue', etc.
For our purposes the important point is that the reference of the presentation is not a function of the reference of the abstract 'parts' one can distinguish in it. One can distinguish abstract parts -Brentano calls them 'divisives' or 'distinctional parts' -because the presentation has multiple objects. It is also the basis for forming the designations of mental acts in the first place.
If our consciousness has only conceptual parts, its reference, the objects it is directed on, cannot be determined by its composition of mental acts that each have a reference. Compare a list name such as 'John, Paul, Ringo and George'. It is a combination of semantic atoms: 'John', 'Paul', 'Ringo' and 'George' each of which refers to one person. The list name refers to several people because it combines the independent 'atoms' 'John', 'Paul', 'Ringo' and George' in a particular way.
Atomists take our consciousness at a time to be like a list name: it is the result of a combination of independent atoms each of which refers to one particular thing. In contrast, Holists take our consciousness at a time to be similar to plural reference without syntactic complexity. Imagine that you point to the Beatles and say
These are 4 of the greatest musicians.
The demonstrative 'these' refers to John, Paul, Ringo and George, but it has no identifiable syntactic parts each of which refers to only one object. Yet, it is right to say that 'these' refers to Paul, among other people. Here we bring a simple term under a partial semantic concept. When we say that hearing F is going on we bring a mental simple under a particular partial concept.
To sum up: For the Atomist the parts of consciousness at a time are (i) prior to the whole and (ii) some of the atoms are mental acts. Therefore the mental reference of the whole can depend on the reference of the atoms. For Brentano, the parts of consciousness at a time are conceptual parts, that is, they are different partial concepts that apply to one mental act. Consequently, the mental reference of the whole cannot depend on the reference of the atoms. There are no atoms. I will call Brentano's view
Mental Holism because it gives explanatory priority to the whole.
As we have seen in § 1 in Psychologie Brentano took 'my soul' or 'my self' to be vacuous singular terms. Mental Holism complements this view. This connection is nicely brought out by Parfit:
Just as there can be single memory of just having had three experiences, such as hearing a bell strike three times, there can be a single state of awareness both of hearing the fourth striking of this bell, and of seeing ravens fly past the bell-tower. Reductionist claim that nothing more is involved in the unity of consciousness at a single time. Since there can be one state of awareness of several experiences, we need not explain this unity by ascribing these experiences to the same person, or subject of experiences. (Parfit 1986, 250-1) A seeing and a hearing are not parts of one consciousness because they are activities of the same subject or soul. Rather a seeing and a hearing are conceptual parts of one consciousness if, and only if, they are co-conscious. A soul is neither experienced nor is it needed to conceptualise an important fact about our conscious life.
Mental Holism and Monism
If one adds a further premise to Brentano's key-assumption
If one is co-aware of some mental activities, these are conceptual parts of a 13 metaphysically simple mental act namely:
One is co-aware of all mental activities that one undergoes at a time one arrives at Mental Monism. At any time there is only one mental act. In the unpublished third volume of Psychologie Brentano seems to endorse Mental Monism:
The totality of our simultaneous mental activities and therefore all our simultaneous presenting belongs to one and the same reality. Everything we present can therefore in one sense be taken to be the content of one presentation that contains in itself a plurality of parts. (Brentano, PS 53, 53015, 20) However, the additional premise is controversial. Marty considered cases where hypnosis brings about something similar to what are now known as 'split-brain' cases.
In such a case, the left brain-hemisphere generates an experience as of a green spot on the left, the right brain-hemisphere generates an experience as of a red spot on the right, but there is no joint awareness of a green and red spot. Marty described these cases as follows:
If this were the case, it would not contradict our concept of the unity of consciousness. Each of these consciousnesses would be one unity. (Marty 2011, 32) (P3) Immediate evidence requires the identity of the judgement and its subject-matter.
Hence: (C) Consciousness of simultaneous mental acts and these acts are identical.
I take the premises in order. with immediate evidence, although you can't distinguish or describe them, as long as they are together differentiated from other activities. Indeed it seems easier and more basic to acknowledge some things together than one thing in isolation.
First (P1):
Brentano often described this in mereological terms. Simultaneous mental acts are given to us as one whole:
We emphasized as a distinguishing characteristic the fact that the mental phenomena which we perceive, in spite of all their multiplicity, always appear to us as a unity, while physical phenomena, which we perceive at the same time, do not all appear in the same way as parts of one single phenomenon. Awareness of seeing blue and hearing F, seeing blue and hearing F are only conceptually different, but really identical. Hence, we arrive at the conclusion:
(C) Consciousness of simultaneous mental acts and these acts are identical.
Brentano's conclusion provides him with a relation between consciousness and its objects that is compatible with the immediate evidence of the former: identity. 12 If one does not want to assume unexplained necessary relations between distinct contingent existences, identity seems to be the best bet for the relation between the immediately evident judgement and its object. They are the same thing conceived of under different concepts. Does Brentano's argument lead to the unwelcome consequence that all immediately evident judgements are identical with their subject-matter? This would be a reductio ad absurdum since, for instance, the immediately evident judgement that 1 = 1 cannot be identical with the fact that 1 = 1. But the obvious fact that 1 = 1 can obtain without anybody making the corresponding judgement.
Hence, it can't be identical to such a judgement. There is no possible world in which we make the judgement that 1 = 1 and it is not the case that 1 = 1, although judgement and fact judged are distinct existences. If at least one of the 'distinct existences' necessarily obtains, there is no need to explain the necessary connection away.
Brentano's Modus Ponens is Armstrong's Modus Tollens. In his
Materialist Theory of the Mind Armstrong argued that the analogue of the awareness of our mental acts is a mechanism that scans its own internal states.
Armstrong continues:
It is clear here that the operation of scanning and the situation scanned must be 'distinct existences'. A machine can scan itself only in the same sense that a man can eat himself. (Armstrong 1968, 107) I can only eat myself by eating a part of me, say my leg, and my leg is not me. A machine can only scan itself by scanning a part of itself. Hence, (C) is false and therefore awareness cannot be immediately evident.
Armstrong's criticism sheds light on Brentano's position. For Brentano and his students this shows that there is no reason to think of awareness as the scanning of mental states. We can reflect and observe our mental acts. This might fruitfully be thought of as an internal scanning. But awareness is supposed to be different from reflection and observation. Armstrong's criticism brings out the importance of the distinction between awareness and observation.
The Separability Challenge
If joint seeing and hearing are different sides of one act, they are not separable.
However, it seems highly plausible that they are separable and therefore not-identical.
In Psychologie Brentano was aware of this Separability Challenge, but dodged it:
This assumption [the unity of consciousness] has its difficulties. If all simultaneous mental acts never were anything but divisives of one and the same unified thing, how could one of them be independent of another one?
And yet this is the case: neither in their coming nor in their ceasing to be are they tied to each other. Consider, for instance, hearing and seeing: sometimes the first occurs without the second and the second without the first, and if they exist simultaneously, one perhaps goes out of existence while the other continues to exist. (Brentano 1874 I, 224 [122] ; in part my translation)
If hearing and seeing are distinct existences, they are not divisives of one presentation. Hence, Brentano can no longer answer the question 'What is the relation between seeing, hearing and consciousness of seeing and hearing that allows for the immediate evidence of the latter?' by saying that the acts involved are divisives or sides of one presentation. A new answer is needed that is compatible with the fact that seeing and hearing are distinct. We need a relation between (i) hearing F, (ii) seeing blue, and (iii) the awareness of hearing F and seeing blue that is compatible with numerical difference between (i)-(iii), yet allows (iii) to be immediately evident with respect to (i) and (ii).
Brentano's Response to the Separability Challenge
The relation we are looking for, Brentano proposed, is the relation of a substance to its accidents, the properties that are particularized by it.
In general, a substance is something that has properties, but is not the property of anything. 13 More precisely, a substance has properties, but it is impossible that it is had by something as a property. A substance can, but need not remain the same in changes; there are fleeting substances. For example, Brentano took colour patches to be substances. If there is something that 'performs' mental activities such as seeing, hearing, thinking, willing etc. as accidents without itself being a mental activity, it is a mental substance. A self is a soul that has one accident that is directed upon the soul whose accident it is. 14 Mental Holism dispensed with mental substances and selves: at any time there is one mental act that has many objects, among them itself. But the mental act is not an accident of a mental substance.
How is the introduction of a mental substance supposed to address the Separability Challenge? We need first the notion of substantial identity. If two distinct accidents are instantiated in the same substance, they are substantially identical.
Substantial identity is not a relation between a substance and itself, but a relation between accidents. Awareness of ϕ-ing and ϕ-ing are both accidents. Brentano argued that awareness of ϕ-ing is immediately evident if, and only if, awareness of ϕ-ing and ϕ-ing are substantially identical. 15 This idea allows (i) hearing F, (ii) seeing blue, and (iii) the awareness of hearing F and seeing blue to be distinct and separable. But the fact that (i)-(iii) inhere in the same soul, argues Brentano, makes it possible that (iii)
is an evident acknowledgement of (i) and (ii).
Evident acknowledgement is supposed to be infallible. Hence, it is not possible that awareness of hearing F and seeing blue exists without hearing F and seeing blue existing. The introduction of a mental substance would help to meet the Separability Challenge only if substantially identical accidents stood in necessary relations to each other. However, in general, there is no necessary relation between different accidents of the same substance. For illustration assume that I am a substance. I am hungry and thirsty at the same time, but I might have been hungry and tired, but not thirsty at that time. If there is no necessary relation between the accidents of a substance, awareness of seeing and hearing and seeing and hearing can be accidents of the same substance, yet the former may exist while the latter doesn't.
Therefore substantial sameness between a mental act and awareness of it does not underwrite the immediate evidence of awareness. So substantial identity does not pull its weight in the theory of consciousness.
To sum up: In 'On the Soul' Brentano rejects Mental Holism and turns to a substance ontology of the mind. His argument is so far unconvincing. The substance ontology faces the same problem as Mental Monism; it does not solve it. However, he did not only posit a soul as a bearer of mental activities. He argued further that we experience the soul. This is a striking claim and if it were right, it would give us a good reason to address the Separability Challenge in the framework of substance ontology. But are mental substances objects of experience?
Brentano counters Hume
Hume reported his introspective findings as follows:
I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.
How can one argue against Hume that a mental substance is given to us in inner perception? Let us look closely at three passages arranged in chronological order that contain Brentano's response to Hume:
(A) If our I intuitively appears to us as thinking and willing, it appears to us with accidents, but someone would err who believes that the appearance would not contain a substance intuitively given. (Brentano 1903, 33 The gist of Brentano's response to Hume is as follows: Fair enough David, I also never can catch myself at any time without a perception. But this does not exclude that I perceive myself only in combination with a perceiving.
16
In order to see Brentano's point consider the following analogy with object perception:
I never see a house without any properties and I never see anything but
properties. Hence, I never see a house.
29
The conclusion that we never see a house is certainly unwelcome. How come that most philosophers are happy to draw the parallel conclusion that we are never introspectively aware of a mental substance?
Part of the diagnosis of the mistake in the argument under discussion is that it assumes that in order to see a physical object one needs to see it 'without any properties'. But how could one see an object without any of its properties or even as something that is distinct from its properties? A 'bare particular' is certainly not a visible thing. The same goes for introspection. If perception of myself requires perceiving a 'bare self', it cannot be done. The right response to this problem is to revise one's view of what perceiving an object -in contrast to perceiving some features/properties/parts -consists in.
Another part of the diagnosis is that Hume is concerned with introspection or observation. Introspecting is the intentional act of focusing attention on particular elements of one's mental life. It is therefore unsurprising that in introspection only mental acts are given to us, we try to attend to them. The soul may not be an object of introspection, but, as Brentano argued, one can be aware of it together with other things.
Perceiving the Soul
Brentano argued that mental substances are given in consciousness together with mental accidents; physical substances are given in outer perception together with spatial and qualitative properties. 17 Here is a representative quote:
] When a concrete, that is, localized coloured thing appears in intuition to us, it appears (and here I allow myself to correct an inconsequence of Aristotle) nothing accidental, but a substance. The object that appears appears with colour and location but these appear not as accidents. Rather its spatial and qualitative determinations are to be conceived as its substantial differences which mutually individuate each other. And when our self intuitively appears to us as thinking and willing it appears to us with accidents.
But we would be mistaken that the appearance did not contain a substance intuitively given. The substance is what bestows the individual difference on thinking and willing if there is another person that thinks and wills the same as we do.
[2] The fact that the individualizing moment can be neither noticed nor characterized in its difference from the one that is given in the appearance of the other person who thinks and wills as we do is an obvious consequence of the limitation that all our mental perceptions concern only our own person. [3] But someone who denied that our perception of mental acts contained an individuating moment without its being noticed had to deny the truth that is accepted by all psychologists that every intuition, also inner intuition, is individual and for this reason deserves the name intuition and no longer the name general concept. (Brentano 1903, 32-33; my translation) First, outer perception and physical substances. We perceive a physical substance with those properties that individuate it and which mutually individuate each other. Location and quality interpenetrate each other so to say, the one is the fundament of the other. There must be something that is connected in a similarly intimate manner with our states of consciousness yet which is not a state of consciousness but which is its fundament just as location and quality are in the realm of the physical.
One may call this substance. (Marty 2011, 30; my translation) Let us accept for the purposes of our argument that the soul individuates mental activities: numerical difference of soul makes for numerical difference of mental act.
In ( individuates them is also given in inner consciousness.
Therefore (C) The soul is given in inner awareness. In sum: Brentano has argued that Hume's slogan 'The soul is not given in inner perception' is true if one understands it as saying that the soul is not given in isolation from its accidents in inner perception. So understood the slogan is not only true, but trivially true and therefore uninteresting. We get a true and interesting reading if we precisify the slogan to the thesis that the soul is given in inner perception together with its accidents. Although this thesis may be true, the soul still fails to be an object of experience in the sense we are interested in. For while the soul can be co-perceived, it cannot be noticed. But we need to notice it if inner perception is to be a source of knowledge of the soul.
To sum up: The soul is not a valuable posit and it is an object of experience only in a Pickwickian sense. But if one does one want to do without it and defend Mental Holism, one needs to answer the Separability Challenge in a new way. I will conclude the paper by suggesting such an alternative response.
A Different Response to the Separability Challenge
Let us take a closer look at Brentano's intuitive motivation for separability: Hence, hearing and seeing at t, the phases of a mental act, are separable and therefore distinct existences.
The key to meeting the Separability Challenge is the principle which gives rise to the challenge. When do we have a real and not merely a conceptual difference? Brentano's answer, in more explicit form, was:
(RealDifference) Given two concepts C 1 and C 2 that denote at most one object (event), if it is possible that C 1 is satisfied without C 2 being satisfied (and vice versa), the satisfier of C 1 ≠ the satisfier of C 2 .
Consider an example to see the intuition that makes (RealDifference) plausible. John's seeing Phosphorus at noon, it is impossible that John sees Phosphorus at noon without seeing Hesperus at noon (and vice versa). In turn, if it is possible that John sees x at time t without seeing y at time t, then x and y are really distinct.
However, (RealDifference) is implausible for objects or events that stand in multiple relations to some things and can be uniquely described in terms of a relation to one of these objects. This sounds rather abstract. thing that describe one object in terms of its different relations to two distinct objects.
As we have seen, it is independently plausible that one and the same thing can satisfy different descriptions of this kind, although it is possible that it only satisfied one and not the other (at a time). Hence, [S's seeing blue at t] and [S's hearing F at t] can be satisfied by the same act and be mere conceptual parts of it, although the act might have satisfied only one of the concepts.
Conclusion
After Psychologie Brentano sided with Descartes against Hume because he convinced himself that some simultaneous mental acts are 'distinct existences' and not mere 'sides' of one presentation. He reintroduced the soul to use the relation of substantial identity to tie these distinct existences together. However, the soul neither pulls its weight in the theory of consciousness nor is it an object of experience. Moreover, Brentano's argument that separability implies real distinctness is unconvincing.
Hence, Mental Holism seems still plausible. At any time, there is only one presentation and, for instance, seeing as well as consciousness of seeing are
